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Systemic risk of maritime-related oil spills viewed from an 1 




There is a wish for economic development in the Arctic, especially in relation to the region’s untapped 6 
marine and hydrocarbon resources. However, such developments are inherently risky, entailing the 7 
possibility of trade-offs and potentially jeopardizing a fragile and pristine natural environment which 8 
provides multiple sources of well-being to the Arctic’s four million inhabitants. When the risks of 9 
economic development are evaluated, they are usually assessed on a micro (enterprise risk) and/or 10 
meso level (portfolio risk, such as an industry). Systemic risk is considered to a much lesser degree. 11 
There is also limited discussion about mitigation methods, including the role of insurance in dealing 12 
with the consequences of failures, such as oil spills. The aim of this study is, therefore, to explore the 13 
systemic risk of maritime-related oil spills in general and place the findings in an Arctic and insurance 14 
perspective. The study is based on secondary data relating to major maritime-related oil spills from 15 
drilling and shipping. Two analytical frameworks were employed, one explaining the scaling of risks, 16 
and another showing the interplay between subsistence and monetized economies in tandem with 17 
their institutional, environmental, social and cultural context. The findings suggest, if the worst-case 18 
scenario materializes, that maritime-related oil spills may have social/cultural, environmental, and 19 
economic impacts, in addition to security/policy implications, as well as affecting businesses involved 20 
in the disaster and their partners. This study has academic implications since there are, so far, limited 21 
studies carried out on systemic-level risk, but it also has policy relevance, for instance for local and 22 
regional authorities and international bodies, such as the Arctic Council, in terms of holistic risk-23 
assessment and its recommended use of appropriate decision-making and evaluative frameworks such 24 
as ecosystem-based management.  25 
 26 















1. Introduction  40 
Arctic boundaries differ depending on who defines the boundary and for what purpose. For 41 
instance, the Arctic can be defined based on ecological, geographical and/or physical 42 
characteristics. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) working group of the 43 
Arctic Council has defined the maritime boundary (AMAP, 2008) (see Fig. 1). For the purpose of 44 
this study the focus will be on the high north, meaning areas where maritime activities are 45 
expected to increase due to a retreat of summer ice, thus opening up new opportunities for off-46 
shore energy production and shipping.  47 
 48 
Fig. 1. The Arctic maritime boundary (AMAP, 2008). 49 
Climate change is causing fundamental changes in the Arctic and the rate of global warming in the 50 
region is twice the global average (Anisimov et al., 2007). This means that there is a 51 
disproportionally high risk for Arctic ecosystems (IPCC, 2018), and there is strong evidence that 52 
various species, ecosystems, and communities are, and will be, exceptionally vulnerable and 53 
adversely affected (Anisimov et al., 2007). Those impacted will not least include indigenous peoples 54 
since Arctic ecosystems provide substantial sources of nutrition, cultural, social and economic 55 
values (AMAP, 2015; IPCC, 2018), with their livelihoods depending on traditional diets harvested 56 
from the land and sea (AMAP, 2015). Other impacts include retreat of the ice sheet of Greenland’s 57 
glacier and ice volume in the Arctic, discharge of rivers into the Arctic Ocean, and thawing and 58 
warming of permafrost with infrastructural consequences for communities as well as injury and 59 
death of people owing to weather events and temperature extremes (Anisimov et al., 2007). The 60 
relatively pristine Arctic environment (Glomsrød, Duhaime, & Aslaksen, 2015) is also at risk 61 
because of manmade pollution including black carbon emissions (CCAC, 2017) and plastics (Cózar 62 
et al., 2017).  63 
The Arctic population itself might be small, at roughly four million (Arctic Council, 2016a), but the 64 
region is increasing in importance in an economic and geopolitical sense, with the potential to 65 
develop significant amounts of oil, gas, and mineral resources (Anisimov et al., 2007). 66 
Opportunities are also recognized in fisheries, shipping and logistics, and tourism (Emmerson & 67 
Lahn, 2012). Possibilities to navigate through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route 68 
will increase due to loss of summer sea-ice (Anisimov et al., 2007; Emmerson & Lahn, 2012), and 69 
in August 2018 a container ship owned by shipping conglomerate Maersk was the first one to 70 
navigate the Northern Sea Route unassisted (Reuters, 2018). For the Arctic’s resources to be 71 
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utilized infrastructure development is needed (Kaiser et al., 2018), and the region’s investment 72 
needs over the next two decades are estimated to be US$1 trillion (Guggenheim, 2016). Economic 73 
development of the Arctic should, however, not jeopardize the natural environment, and in order 74 
to reach this goal three principles are emphasized; sound science, prudent management based on 75 
conservation, and a responsive public process (Arctic Council, 1999).  76 
“For me - and for most Alaskans - the choice isn't either-or. We believe that by doing 77 
development right, we can have good jobs and a growing, healthy economy and protect our 78 
environment (Tony Knowles, 1999)”. 79 
Current studies on risk in the Arctic linked to marine-related oil spills have tended to focus on 80 
impacts to economic sectors and companies (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012; Jóhannsdóttir & Cook, 81 
2015). In the context of the sustainability of marine-related economic developments in the Arctic, 82 
there is a need for a broader discussion about risk (Arctic Today, 2019), since economic 83 
developments could lead to potentially negative consequences for the sustainability of the region 84 
and a worst-case scenario may put a lot of strain on local communities, especially small and 85 
indigenous communities in the region (Green, Kilcullen, Long, Samuel-Horsfall, & Schanne, 2016; 86 
Taylor, 2014). Increased economic activities in the Arctic, such as trans-Atlantic or destination 87 
shipping, or offshore energy developments (SINTEF, 2011), will exacerbate the risk of major 88 
pollution incidents such as oil spills (AMAP, 2015). A significant oil spill may have more serious 89 
consequences in the Arctic than in other parts of the world, given factors such as the fragility of 90 
Arctic ecosystems, the region’s small population (Arctic Council, 2016a), subsistence ways of living 91 
for indigenous communities (Fall, 1991), challenging weather conditions, (EPPR, 2017)”, 92 
infrastructure limitations (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012; Skinner & Reilly, 1989), limited search and 93 
rescue capabilities, and a lack of local level preparedness (Arctic Council, 2018c). It has, 94 
furthermore, been pointed out that oil spills in ice infested waters are harder to deal with than 95 
open water, and that Arctic waters “might never recover from an environmental catastrophe like 96 
the one in the Gulf of Mexico” (Stotts, 2010). Issues with liability have been emphasized, where it 97 
is claimed that international conventions or international agreements do not exist that “establishes 98 
a liability system for claims for compensation or the cost of cleaning up pollution for an offshore 99 
oil and gas incident either in the Arctic or anywhere else in the world” (WWF, 2015, p. 7). In 100 
addition, given Arctic conditions, clean-up costs are likely to be significantly greater than in less 101 
remote areas with more developed infrastructure, and milder weather conditions (Bonnieux & 102 
Rainelli, 1993). 103 
It is particularly important to discuss Arctic risks that are of such a scale that they may have 104 
systematic consequences if they materialize through human or technological failures. Risks in 105 
various forms will exist in today’s societies, but must be recognized in order that they can be 106 
mitigated and managed (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003). In recent 107 
years, increased attention has been paid by policymakers to the general concept of risk in relation 108 
to Arctic ecosystems and local communities. For example, Lilja Alfreðsdóttir, Iceland’s Minister of 109 
Education, Science and Culture, has emphasized the importance of nature protection by 110 
highlighting the Paris Agreement and three legally binding Arctic agreements; Agreement on 111 
Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (signed 2017), Agreement on Cooperation on 112 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed 2013), and Agreement on 113 
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (signed 2011) (Arctic 114 
Council, 2017a; Lilja Alfreðsdóttir, 2018). However, despite recognition, the main way of mitigating 115 
risks in industrialized societies is through the mechanisms of the insurance system. Currently, very 116 
limited knowledge exists on insurance related to Arctic-specific risks associated with economic 117 
4 
 
development, especially hydrocarbon projects (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012; Jóhannsdóttir & Cook, 118 
2015).  119 
The aim of the study is to explore systemic risk of maritime-related oil spills in particular and place 120 
the findings in an  Arctic and insurance perspective. The research questions proposed are:  121 
• How is systemic risk defined? 122 
• What are the consequences when failures occur involving major marine-related oil spills?  123 
• How might the consequences of major oil spills caused by failure look like in the Arctic? 124 
• What is the role of insurance in cases of major marine-related oil spills?  125 
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 includes a literature review and overview 126 
covering systemic risk, systems failure, high reliability organizations, and mega projects, with these 127 
topics shedding light on the magnitude and causes of failures. The section also discusses insurers’ views 128 
on systemic risk, the Arctic Council’s perspective on the topic in relation to oil spills, and the 129 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMOs) view on these issues. Section 3 outlines the research 130 
method and analytical frameworks employed. Section 4 presents the findings, and sections 5 and 6 131 
cover the discussion and conclusions.  132 
 133 
2. Literature review and overview  134 
 135 
2.1 Systemic risk and systems failure 136 
There is no universal definition of risk, but drawing from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 137 
Change (IPCC) it is the “potential for adverse consequences from a hazard for human and natural 138 
systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and exposure of the 139 
affected system” (IPCC, 2018, p. 33). In this study, the focus is on maritime-related hazards of oil spills. 140 
In cases of systemic risk there is a trigger event, a tipping point, which can be an institutional failure or 141 
economic shock that “causes a chain of bad economic consequences – sometimes referred to as a 142 
domino effect (Schwarcz, 2008, p. 198)”. The chain of consequences can be “financial institutions 143 
and/or market failure” or “significant losses to financial institutions or substantial financial-market 144 
price volatility” in less severe cases, but the impact will have consequences for either institutions or 145 
markets, or both (Schwarcz, 2008, p. 198)”. Bank collapses are seen as symbols of systemic risk 146 
according to Schwarcz (2008). This was very much evident in the banking crisis of 2008, such as in the 147 
case of Iceland where the whole banking system collapsed (Árnason, Nordal, & Ástgeirsdóttir, 2010). 148 
So as to hedge against systemic risk, the strategy of investors is typically to diversify their investment 149 
portfolios. Theoretically, institutional systemic risk can be cancelled out if the risk “is negatively 150 
correlated, or uncorrelated, with market risk”, but if it is “positively correlated with markets” it cannot 151 
be cancelled out (Schwarcz, 2008, p. 200).  152 
Based on the above understandings, Schwarcz (2008) has proposed a definition of systemic risk, which 153 
he regards as a risk to a financial system, not a risk within a system. This delineation aligns with the 154 
London School of Economics which distinguishes between shocks from outside a system (exogenous 155 
risk) and shocks from within a system (endogenous risk) (Danielsson & Shin, 2002). Schwarcz’s (2008, 156 
p. 204) definition is as follows:  157 
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a 158 
panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of 159 
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significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or 160 
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.   161 
Structural flaws embedded in complex networks are another way of defining systemic risk (Goldin & 162 
Vogel, 2010; Humphreys & Thompson, 2014). “Thus, higher degrees of systemic risk increase the 163 
probabilities of breakdowns, accidents, and adverse consequences in ways that are beyond the control 164 
of any given actor in the system” (Humphreys & Thompson, 2014, p. 880). Market and institutional 165 
systemic risk can therefore not be viewed in isolation from each other (Schwarcz, 2008), and a 166 
feedback loop between systems and portfolios should be considered (Baue, 2017; Burckart, 167 
Lydenberg, & Ziegler, 2016). Failure of a system happens because of interlinkages within a system, 168 
causing an entire breakdown rather than failure of individual parts or components, which leads to 169 
widespread and severe economic consequences (PwC, 2014; The Systemic Risk Centre (SRC), 2013; 170 
Zhang, 2018).  171 
Collective interests of a group or society might be set aside, even though collective actions might 172 
prevent systemic risk and stabilize the system. This is despite the external costs of systemic failure, 173 
such as social costs, which otherwise might have to be internalized (Schwarcz, 2008). According to 174 
Schwarcz (2008), this then results in the tragedy of the commons, where the market players reap the 175 
most benefit of given resources without taking notice of the welfare of others who may bear the cost 176 
of the outcomes, such as unemployment or widespread poverty, which may in turn lead to increased 177 
crime. Furthermore, market players may also discount the potential impacts of systemic risk, because 178 
they are so rare in comparison to other types of market risks (Schwarcz, 2008). Schwarcz (2008) 179 
therefore highlights the necessity of regulating systemic risk, while ensuring that the economic costs 180 
of regulation do not exceed the benefits.  With the aim of protecting the whole system by preventing 181 
or internalizing systemic risk, regulation is needed (Humphreys & Thompson, 2014; Schwarcz, 2008). 182 
Otherwise the cost will be externalized, as the members of the market will first and foremost protect 183 
themselves as they have limited or no incentives to limit risk taking in order to “reduce the danger of 184 
contagion for other firms” (Schwarcz, 2008, p. 206).  185 
Within the financial community the idea of an “universal” investor has emerged, but such an investor 186 
would take into account the whole economy, not solely the performance of specific securities. 187 
Externalities to specific investments are believed to affect other investments throughout the 188 
investment portfolio (Burckart et al., 2016, p. 3). To bridge between current investment practices and 189 
systems-level thinking there are ten tools investors can use, which are 1) additionality, 2) diversity of 190 
approach, 3) evaluation, 4) geographic location, 5) interconnectedness, 6) policy 7) self-organization, 191 
8) solutions, 9) standard setting, and 10) utility.   192 
In case of investments, the focus has mainly been on enterprise level risks or risks in investment 193 
portfolios (meso level), while investors are just recognizing systemic risk (macro level), and to a lesser 194 
extent existential risk (cosmic level) (Thurm, Baue, & Lugt, 2018), which is essential to deal with so-195 
called wicked problems than cannot be tamed, such as climate change or droughts (Batie, 2008). The 196 
career risk (nano level) focuses on risks faced by individuals (including investors) that focus on 197 
maintaining “business-as-usual” and are thus “dis-incentivized from pushing for the degree of 198 
transformation needed” in investments (Thurm et al., 2018, p. 38). When analyzing a technically 199 
complicated system, it can be of use to strip the system into layers so each aspect can be viewed 200 
separately and in the context of the upper layer(s) of the system. The risk system proposed by 201 
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Reporting 3.01 has five levels of risks (see Fig. 2). The hierarchical pyramid ranges from the nano to 202 
cosmic level (Thurm et al., 2018). The layered approach is also conducted in the TeCSMART framework 203 
which looks at the following layers: equipment, plant, management, market, regulatory environment, 204 
governmental environment, and society (Zhang, 2018).  205 
 206 
Fig. 2. Business Model Transformation Scaling Progression adapted from Reporting 3.0 by the 207 
author (Thurm et al., 2018, p. 49).   208 
 209 
Sometimes the claim is made that systems are too big to fail, such as energy production (Lakoff, 2010) 210 
or financial systems (Árnason et al., 2010). Nevertheless, history is littered with cases of systemic 211 
failure (Flyvbjerg, 2014). In order to understand and manage systemic risks, various research projects 212 
have been proposed, including studies focused on offshore oil and gas operations (The National 213 
Academies of Sciences, 2017). Viewing systemic risk solely as a risk to a financial system may be 214 
considered too limited, since systems are typically comprised of a multitude of environmental, social, 215 
financial, and technological components (Baue, 2017; Burckart et al., 2016; King, Schrag, Dadi, Ye, & 216 
Ghosh, 2015; Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2017). Relatively recent failures of broad socio-technical 217 
systems include the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988, the Northeast Blackout in the parts of the 218 
Northeastern and Midwestern United States and the Canadian province of Ontario in 2003, the space 219 
shuttle disaster in 2003, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the Volkswagen Emissions 220 
Scandal (2016) (Zhang, 2018). Such occurrences suggest that systemic risk is not infrequent and needs 221 
to be discussed on a broader level than from just the financial and/or market perspective due to the 222 
high interconnectivity of systems (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2017).  223 
To understand how organizations fail, causing systemic failure, the idea of high reliable organizations 224 
(HROs) carrying out high-reliable operations have been discussed (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 225 
2011; Roberts & Bea, 2001). These organizations will run complicated systems, such as nuclear power 226 
plants, chemical plants, nuclear-waste storage, electric grids, financial networks, and 227 
telecommunication and computer networks (Roberts & Bea, 2001). Systemic failures are in most cases 228 
caused by human or organizational errors (80%) (Bonnieux & Rainelli, 1993), while design errors or 229 
other factors cause only around 20% of the failures. Five building blocks are proposed that may 230 
 
1 Reporting 3.0 is defined as a global work-ecosystem that aims to scout out and accelerate reporting 
innovations for the purpose of bringing global capitalism onto a sustainable path and make a regenerative and 
inclusive economy reality. 
Career risk - nano level
Enterprise risk - micro level
Portfolio risk - meso level
Systemic risk - macro level  
Existential risk - cosmic level
7 
 
mitigate systemic failure and catastrophes and enhance reliability in organizations. These are 231 
structural failure, efficiency versus reliability, core competencies and incompetencies, sense-making, 232 
and group performance and heedful interaction (Roberts & Bea, 2001). To address organizational 233 
weaknesses that may cause systems to fail organizational norms need to acknowledge that 234 
technological failures occur and there might be other potential causes of significance. Furthermore, 235 
organizational structure needs to be fluid where bureaucratic hierarchical structures may have to be 236 
set aside if conditions change. There has to be an understanding of what signifies as changing 237 
conditions; mechanisms of reliability as opposed to efficiency need to be incorporated into the 238 
organizational culture and core competencies that may turn in to incompetencies in situations of 239 
emergency need to be recognized. Additionally, people capable of making sense of the situation may 240 
have to be brought in to question perceptions made; and organizational members need to be trained 241 
in heedful interaction, thus enhancing group performance (Roberts & Bea, 2001).   242 
The features of systemic risk and potential for systemic failure is particularly evident in connection 243 
with megaprojects. “Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion dollars 244 
or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are 245 
transformational, and impact millions of people” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 3). Examples of megaprojects are 246 
infrastructure projects, e.g. airports or seaports, offshore oil and gas extraction, large container or 247 
cruise ships, mining, and so on. In an Arctic context, megaprojects might not benefit a large number of 248 
people directly, but they are likely to also do so indirectly, for example through increased local 249 
economic activity. These projects are carried out for various reasons, such as political (monuments), 250 
technological (big, tall, fast, long), economic (job and money making), or aesthetic (beauty of design) 251 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014). However, these types of projects are characteristically risky for various reasons, such 252 
as in terms of planning, leadership, multi-actor involvement, and conflicting interests. For these 253 
reasons, “misinformation about costs, schedules, benefits, and risks is the norm”, where benefits are 254 
overestimated, and costs underestimated, and megaprojects are more prone to being unsuccessful 255 
than successful in terms of these factors, resulting in “net loss to the economy, instead of gain” 256 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014, p. 8; 12). There are, however, some positive signs in relation to the management and 257 
regulation of megaprojects, including new legislation, good governance practices, and public hearings 258 
for cases of failures (Flyvbjerg, 2014), but public policy needs to also address systemic failures, 259 
“through regulation, economic intervention and incentives as well as improved communication” 260 
(Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2017, p. 28). 261 
2.2 The Arctic Council, systemic risk and oil spills   262 
Member states of the Arctic Council are Canada, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, including 263 
the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the Unites States, and six Arctic 264 
Indigenous Peoples international organizations have permanent participant status within the Arctic 265 
Council (Arctic Council, 2015). A vast amount of information exists on the webpage of the Arctic 266 
Council, including reports issued by the body’s various working groups. Searching the Arctic Council 267 
website, and its open access archive, for the concepts of “systemic risk” or “systemic failure” resulted 268 
in zero items in the case of the website, but eight items from the archive. Further screening of the 269 
documents revealed two items of relevance, i.e. [environmental] problems in the Russian Arctic and 270 
transboundary causes and effects (Arctic Council Secretariat & Russian Delegation to the Arctic Council, 271 
2010, p. 2), and Arctic transportation infrastructure (Institute of the North, 2012).  272 
The Arctic Council’s archive, however, offers greater information about oil spills with a total of 381 273 
items found (Arctic Council, n.d.). A mind map in Mindjet MindManager 2018 was developed to get an 274 
overview of the search findings. Based on this analysis the main themes that surfaced were strategic 275 
plans of the Arctic Council, meetings and statements, task forces of the Arctic Council, agreements 276 
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made, cooperation and risk assessments, various projects and reports, economic activities related to 277 
offshore oil and gas projects, as well as guidance and tools recommended or developed in the context 278 
of potential oil spills (Arctic Council, n.d.). Advanced searches of the Arctic Council archive using the 279 
terms “oil spill” and “social” or “indigenous” resulted in zero items.  280 
The Arctic Council’s ministerial declarations from 2004 onward make it is evident that oil and gas, as 281 
well as shipping, are growing concerns, and that there is an emerging need for knowledge on these 282 
topics. Since 2006, the emphasis on engaging indigenous peoples into policy planning and 283 
implementation, as well as enhancing their adaptive capacity, has been on the rise, and from a 284 
systemic perspective new emphasis has been placed since 2013 on how to exploit the economic 285 
potential of the region, while at the same time managing conceivable harms to Arctic cultures and its 286 
environment. In addition, a recent report from the Arctic Council entitled Digital resources brings forth 287 
the importance of oil pollution prevention in the Arctic marine environment from offshore petroleum 288 
activities (Arctic Council, 2017d, 2018a), such as an agreement on cooperation concerning marine oil 289 
pollution preparedness and responses in the Arctic (MOSPA), technical analysis of circumpolar oil spill 290 
response viability, standardization as a tool for the prevention of oil spills in the Arctic, and 291 
implementation of a framework plan for cooperation on the prevention of oil pollution from petroleum 292 
and maritime activities in the marine areas of the Arctic. It is evident from the Digital resources report 293 
that the focus is on pollution preparedness and responses to oil and gas activities (Arctic Council, 294 
2018a). There is less focus on oil spills related to shipping in particular although guidelines can be 295 
found, such as from the PAME working group of the Arctic Council, where the focus is on oil transfer, 296 
such as between vessels, or between vessels and the shore facility or vice versa (PAME, 2004).  297 
Despite efforts it is apparent that more can be done to prevent oil spills in Arctic waters, and to 298 
enhance adequate response capacity to spills across the Arctic (PAME, 2011).  Proceedings on Arctic 299 
transportation infrastructure, response capacity and sustainable development highlights a limited 300 
focus on the social aspect of the topic, although it is stated that “[s]tates can consider the impact of 301 
infrastructure on social and economic development“ (Institute of the North, 2012, p. 19).  Increased 302 
traffic in Arctic waters is expected to increase the likelihood of incidents, and thus the risk becomes 303 
greater. It is emphasized that the increased likelihood of incidents should influence decisions on 304 
infrastructure investments. However, Arctic investment (i.e. vessels, harbors/ports, airports, 305 
communication/navigation and workforce) is considered to be riskier than elsewhere, and as a result 306 
infrastructure investment may be quite limited unless extraction is considered economically viable. 307 
Furthermore, risk assessment should be a part of a safety management system adopted across all 308 
Arctic nations, but there are questions about what risks should be assessed, on what scale and who is 309 
responsible for the risk assessment and consequently for negative impacts from incidents (Institute of 310 
the North, 2012).  311 
In relations to oil and gas activities further work and collaboration are needed, such as engagement of 312 
indigenous peoples, risk assessment/analysis, and emergency preparedness and response (Arctic 313 
Council, 2016c), all of which are critically important if a systemic risk materializes related to marine oil 314 
spills. Furthermore, knowledge about the long-term impacts of economic development on the Arctic 315 
region and on Arctic citizens such as from pollution or overuse of resources, are still lacking (Arctic 316 
Council, 1999). It should however been noted that a map and preparedness database for small Arctic 317 
communities has been created, representing “tangible resources remote Arctic communities can use“ 318 
in cases of oil spills (Institute of the North, n.d.). Although, the database offers a valuable overview of 319 
multilateral and national agreements, recommendations, guidelines, strategies, interactive maps, and 320 
databases covering Arctic communities e.g. size of population, latitude and longitude, the practical use 321 
of the database is not evident in cases of oil spills.    322 
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One of the Arctic Council’s goals, presented in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2015-2025 (AMSP), and 323 
approved at a ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Canada in 2015, is to “[e]nhance the economic, social and 324 
cultural well-being of Arctic inhabitants, including Arctic indigenous peoples and strengthen their 325 
capacity to adapt to changes in the Arctic marine environment” (Arctic Council, 2017b, p. 2). 326 
Nevertheless, the potential for conflicts of interest are also raised, for instance between fisheries, local 327 
community subsistence livelihoods and companies working in oil and gas extraction (ARAF Chair, 2016; 328 
Arctic Council, 2016b). A systematic disconnection was observed in 2015 between exploitation, 329 
cultural and environmental interests, and a power imbalance between stakeholders (Arctic Council, 330 
2016b). This was evident in discussions about using standardization as a tool for the prevention for 331 
prevention of oil spills in the Arctic. Concerning a standardization process in the petroleum industry, 332 
stakeholders taking part in a hearing about the standard draft included “relevant authorities, 333 
organizations and industry groups / associations”, although proposals for new standards may come 334 
from “individuals, NGOs, companies [or] industry associations (Arctic Council, 2017c)”. The aim of the 335 
standardization process might also be to work “in partnership with key stakeholders”, but it is not 336 
transparent who these stakeholders are and what is at stake from their viewpoint (Det norske Veritas, 337 
2013, p. 40). It is, however, apparent that research on “oil drilling and transportation of oil and other 338 
hazardous goods in Arctic waters“, as well as “possibilities for increased cooperation in the field of 339 
culture in the different parts of the Arctic region“ is still needed (Arctic Council, 2014).  340 
2.3 Insurers’ view on systemic risk  341 
In a 2014 report, initiated by the WWF and RSA Insurance Group plc., the focus was on emphasizing 342 
how environmental systemic risk is understood by the insurance sector, and if insurers can do more in 343 
taking such risk into account within their long-term strategies or the strategies of their customers’ 344 
(PwC, 2014). Examples are provided on how man-made action can exacerbate issues, such as in the 345 
case of heavy rainfall in Chile in 2009, where deforestation caused low-grade nitrogen fertilizers to 346 
wash across farmland until the contaminated water reached to fish farms, resulting in algae bloom 347 
starving fish from oxygen and bringing about a multi-million dollar insurance claim (PwC, 2014). This 348 
example highlights the link between environmental and financial systemic risks. The insurance report 349 
therefore suggests that in order to detect and mitigate financial risk a deeper approach is required 350 
(PwC, 2014). For instance, if an oil tanker is lost at sea, the consequences might not be limited to the 351 
financial losses of the value of the ship and its cargo. Impacts might also include crude oil spills that 352 
could “have a profound effect on wildlife, on nearby coastline, on those who depend on fishing or 353 
tourism in the area and so forth” (PwC, 2014, p. 4).  354 
In the insurance report systemic risks are characterized by (PwC, 2014, p. 4):   355 
“… complexity, uncertainty, ripple effects and the potential for irreversibility. There may be little 356 
or no historical precedence to use as guidance. On many occasions the scale of the risk might 357 
only be revealed when the worst happens, but effective risk management can identify existing 358 
or potential interdependencies and seek to isolate risks, prevent contagion and mitigate 359 
damage.” 360 
It is further noticed that natural catastrophes, e.g. weather related, or industrial/man-made incidents, 361 
such as pollution, can cause systemic risks (PwC, 2014). Environmental risk exposure has already been 362 
recognized by reinsurance companies and large insurance companies (PwC, 2014), while smaller 363 
insurance companies are not as well prepared to deal with these types of risks (Johannsdottir & 364 
Wallace, 2019b; Jóhannsdóttir, 2012a, 2012b). Therefore, it would be beneficial to approach 365 
environmental systemic risk on an industry-wide level (PwC, 2014). The insurance report states that 366 
stakeholders will gradually expect insurers to consider environmental systemic risk given the wide 367 
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impacts these losses can have. Although, some industry-wide approaches and initiative are evident in 368 
this regard, e.g. the ClimateWise, Geneva Association and the UN Principles for Sustainable Insurance, 369 
it is underlined that more needs to be done for the greater good of the industry, those seeking 370 
insurance protection (PwC, 2014), and also society.  371 
2.4 The International Maritime Organization, systemic risk and shipping in Arctic waters 372 
Based on common interests the Arctic Council develops unified approaches and positions with regards 373 
to international organizations, including: The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the 374 
International Maritime Satellite Organization (IMSO), the International Hydrographic Organization 375 
(IHO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), since collaboration with these institutions 376 
advances the safety of Arctic maritime shipping (Arctic Council, 2009). Furthermore, the IMO adopted 377 
the Polar Code, an international regime for ships operating in Polar waters in 2014. The Polar Code 378 
entered into force in 2017, but its significance relates to the protection of ships and people onboard, 379 
both seafarers and passengers, in harsh and inhospitable waters.  The Polar Code has the potential to 380 
mitigate the risks of sailing in the Arctic by contributing to risk appraisal, going beyond the key factors 381 
used to determine insurance premiums (ship, navigating limits, insurance coverage, insured risk 382 
profile), however, various shortcomings have been identified, including lack of data, exclusion groups 383 
of vessels such as fishing vessels, omission of carried goods, and use of heavy fuel oil with associated 384 
air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions (Fedi, Faury, & Gritsenko, 2018). Some recommendations 385 
made in the Polar Code, e.g. concerning the management of ballast water, are also non-mandatory. 386 
Related amendments, to make the Polar Code mandatory, have been made to the legally binding 387 
agreements of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and 388 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (IMO, n.d.-b). The Polar Code also 389 
addresses environmental issues, and aims to protect the environment, by preventing oil spills, invasive 390 
species, sewage, garbage, and chemical discharges (IMO, n.d.-a). Ship safety is emphasized through 391 
prescriptions concerning their design and construction, the types of equipment on board, and the 392 
operations and manning of ships, including navigation, certificates and manals, and required training 393 
(IMO, n.d.-c). Mandatory measures, and recommended provisions, are included regarding safety and 394 
pollution. According to the Polar Code, the ship master shall consider, when sailing in polar waters, 395 
issues such as navigation availability, ice conditions, available places of refuge, densities of marine 396 
mammals, national and international designated protected areas along the sailing route, as well as the 397 
remoteness from search and rescue (SAR) capabilities (IMO, 2015). In this context, it is important to 398 
highlight that oil spill response viability varies greatly throughout the year, with the situation better 399 
during summer months (July to October), when most areas are ice-free. However, during winter 400 
months’, responses may not be as favorable. Location is another key aspect affecting likely response 401 
times. Oil spill responses are more favorable in the Bering Sea, Barents Sea, Norwegian Sea, Baffin Bay, 402 
Hudson Bay, and North Atlantic, while the situation is less favorable in other areas within the Polar 403 
region (EPPR, 2017).  404 
3. Research method 405 
For analysis purposes, two frameworks are employed to capture the hierarchical character and 406 
dynamics of various risks in an Arctic context, before a case study approach is applied to identify the 407 
systemic risk events associated with marine oil spills, including incidents in Arctic waters.  408 
First, the Reporting 3.0 framework (Thurm et al., 2018, p. 49) (see Fig. 2), has been applied to the Arctic 409 
context (see Fig. 3). The schematic highlights how systemic risk, such as an oil spill, may transform into 410 
an existential risk for subsistence economies. Therefore, feedback loops between the subsistence and 411 
existential levels are integrated into the model. In addition, levels of risks increase from level-to-level, 412 
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and higher risk levels at the base of the pyramid should take into account risks that are less broad in 413 
impact.  414 
 415 
Fig. 3. Scaling of risks. Model developed by authors, inspired by the Reporting 3.0 Business Model 416 
Transformation Scaling Progression model (Thurm et al., 2018, p. 49).   417 
Second, an unpublished conceptual framework showing the interdependence of subsistence and 418 
market economies in the Arctic (see Fig. 4), developed by a group of Fulbright Arctic Initiative (FAI) 419 
scholars, was employed (Larsen et al., under review by Global Policy). This conceptual framework 420 
explains how subsistence (non-monetized) economies, mixed economies and market (monetized) 421 
economies co-exist in the Arctic. The framework also highlights that economic activities may be on 422 
different scales, ranging from local to global. Furthermore, the framework places these economies in 423 
their institutional, environmental, social and cultural context (Larsen et al., under review by Global 424 
Policy). The framework allows for comparative analysis of Arctic economies, which is of importance 425 
since economic opportunities for market economies may entail risks for subsistence economies, or 426 
vice versa. Additionally, it enables a system level of analysis by recognizing the elements and 427 
complicated relationships presented in the framework. The FAI scholars also state the benefits of the 428 
framework, such as for different academic disciplines, for policy makers and practitioners, and for 429 
regions other than the Arctic, if these regions include the types of economies presented in the 430 
conceptual framework (Larsen et al., under review by Global Policy). 431 
Subsistence level of risks, e.g. individuals and/or 
communities 
Enterprise level of risks, e.g. ship or an oil rig
Portfolio level of risks, e.g. industries
Systemic level of risk, e.g. breakdown of systems
Existential level of risks, e.g. risk to pristine Arctic 




Fig. 4. Subsistence and market economies interdependence (Larsen et al., under review).  433 
3.1 Case selection and data collection  434 
It is relatively easy to come up with a list of major maritime-related oil spill disasters, since rankings 435 
are determined based on quantity or an estimation of oil spilled (ChartsBin, 2011; Encyclopaedia 436 
Britannica, 2018; Marine Insight, 2018; Mother Nature Network, 2010; The Telegraph, 2011). In this 437 
study, the cases were based on quantity and, if evident, their relevance for an insurance or Arctic 438 
context, such as the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez oil spills (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012; Rees & 439 
Sharp, 2011). Table 1. provide details on the selected cases. It provides the names of each case, 440 
location and causes of the spills, quantity of oil spilled, as well as year of the spills. The size of each spill 441 
might vary slightly depending on the particular source of information, but what should be noted is that 442 
the Deepwater Horizon is the largest, and the Exxon Valdez by far the smallest in terms of quantity of 443 
oil spilled. The smallest case in terms of quantity was Exxon Valdez, in 1989, with 11 million gallons of 444 
oil, and the largest was the Deepwater Horizon in 2010, where the estimated quantity was 210 million 445 
gallons of oil (ChartsBin, 2011; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018; Marine Insight, 2018; Mother Nature 446 
Network, 2010; The Telegraph, 2011). To highlight the dates of their occurrence, the oldest cases are 447 
in white and light gray scales, and the most recent ones in darker gray scales.  448 
Table 1. Overview of the oil spill cases (ChartsBin, 2011; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018; Marine 449 




The case study search highlighted the limitations of the data collection mode. The same technique for 452 
gathering data was impossible for all cases for many reasons. These included the location of the spills, 453 
where limited information was available on the South Africa and the Caribbean cases. This contrasted 454 
with cases where much more detailed information was available and the language of publications was 455 
English, such as the United States cases. Therefore, various search methods had to be employed to 456 
identify relevant information. One was to use the United States Environmental Protection Agency 457 
(EPA)2 database. It stored many cases reports, generally titled by the name of the case with the subtitle 458 
A report to the president. Another approach was to use academic databases such as EBSCOhost, 459 
ProQuest, and the Web of Science. Google search was additionally used to identify news about the 460 
events, in addition to the snowball strategy (Cook et al., 2019; Palinkas et al., 2015), where references 461 
from reports and papers were used to identify other relevant publications. When considering the 462 
limitations of this study, we would like to emphasize that the adopted case study approach relies more 463 
heavily on recent examples of marine-related oil spills, as there is limited data availability and reporting 464 
on earlier cases, and thus they correspondingly receive relatively less focus in this paper. It can, 465 
therefore, not be stated that data saturation was reached for the older cases. It should, nevertheless, 466 
be highlighted that when particular issues had been identified in several cases such as “clean-up 467 
cost/cost of habitat restoration” or “loss of lives, injuries, stress-related impacts on survivors”, it was 468 
not considered of relevance to invest a great deal of time to find the same issues, for instance in the 469 
oldest cases, where limited information were available. In other cases, particular issues were only 470 
found in a particular case, for instance “separated families and alcoholism”, despite a search for the 471 
same issues and the title of other cases studied. In these cases, saturation was considered to have 472 
been reached.  473 
3.2 Data gathering and analysis  474 
Various databases, such as EBSCOhost and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 475 
database, were scrutinized to find relevant documents relating to each case study. The title of each 476 
case plus oil spill, e.g. “Exxon Valdez oil spill”, was used as a search theme, then more specifically these 477 
themes were used in a combined search with concepts such as “report”, “impact”, “loss”, etc. Then an 478 
Excel spreadsheet was used to track themes applicable to each case, and information was then 479 
synthesized (see Fig. 5) and presented in the findings section. The purpose was not to compare or 480 
 
2 https://nepis.epa.gov.  
14 
 
contrast cases, but rather to deduce the possible impacts pertaining to worst-case scenarios when a 481 
systemic risk of marine-related oil spills materializes.   482 
4. Findings 483 
Fig. 5 presents a holistic depiction of the worst-case scenario when a systemic risk of marine-related 484 
oil spills materializes. Information has been drawn from the cases studied and summarized in the 485 
figure. Impacts have been categorized as social/cultural, environmental, economic, security/policy and 486 
business-related, with each a contributor to the systemic risk. One should note that some issues might 487 
fall under more than one category. For instance, contamination of food sources, and consequently 488 
food security, might be discussed both under environmental and social/cultural impacts. To limit the 489 
length of the discussion each topic is only covered once, except the issue of legal proceedings since 490 
stakeholders may vary based on whose interests are being discussed. Each of the five categories shown 491 
in Fig. 5 are then analyzed in further detail, with sections 4.1 to 4.5 following the structure of analysis 492 
set out in Fig. 5, which breaks the consequences of oil spills down into their respective components: 493 
sociocultural; environmental; economic; security/policy; and business/partners. Then their specifics 494 
linked to the Arctic and insurance are evaluated in sections 4.6 and 4.7. 495 
 496 





4.1 Social-cultural impacts  500 
In some oil spill cases there were losses of human lives and/or injuries (Deepwater Horizon Study 501 
Group, 2011). In other cases, such tragedies did not occur (ERCO/Energy Resource Co. Inc., 1982) or 502 
information about injuries or deaths were not easily found. Loss of employment, livelihood and 503 
earnings of locals are reported in some cases and migration of unemployed oilfield workers, while in 504 
some other cases there is a temporary increase in income of those taking part in clean-up activities 505 
(National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). A spill may 506 
also have a stress-related impact on survivors, or physical or psychological health effects on survivors, 507 
locals and/or children including post-traumatic stress, anxiety or depression, particularly in relation to 508 
clean-up activities or loss of economic status. Such consequences are mainly discussed in the case of 509 
Exxon Valdez (Palinkas, Russell, Downs, & Petterson, 1992; Skinner & Reilly, 1989) and Deepwater 510 
Horizon (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). The 511 
consequences for affected individuals may include an increase in alcoholism, suicides, family violence, 512 
or separation of families (Mambra, 2018; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 513 
and Offshore Drilling, 2011; The Sydney Morning Herald, 2010).  514 
Cleaning activities may put a constraint on local communities, especially small communities, due to 515 
temporary, but massive, increases in population during clean-up activities (Taylor, 2014). This may put 516 
constraints on the “economic, political, and social infrastructure”, and in the case of the Exxon Valdez 517 
oil spill “housing quantities became inadequate, social service organizations were put under immense 518 
pressure, crime rates spiraled, and the health, sewer, and garbage agencies could not keep up with the 519 
massive scaling” of activities (Green et al., 2016). To address some of the housing issues vessels were 520 
used as floating hotels for oil spill workers (Taylor, 2014).  521 
Concerns over occupational and health issues are also evident in connection with those taking part in 522 
clean-up and exposed residents (Laborers' National Health and Safety Fund, 1989; Skinner & Reilly, 523 
1989). Consequently, there is a need for long-term health surveillance and longitudinal studies after a 524 
large scale oil spill event occurs (Lichtveld et al., 2016; Skinner & Reilly, 1989). Furthermore, there may 525 
be loss of cultural, aesthetic, and recreational uses of beaches or wetlands (Bonnieux & Rainelli, 1993; 526 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).   527 
Civil class action lawsuits are likely in case of oil spills, but they can drag on for years or even decades 528 
such as in the case of the Exxon Valdez disaster (Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, 2006; 529 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). This may 530 
cause a “shift in the source of disruption and stress from the spill to the litigation” (Picou & Martin, 531 
2007, p. 38). In addition, there may be a loss in trust (Shaw, 1992) on a broad scale, stemming from 532 
those causing the disaster or the industry (Ebinger, 2016), food safety and security (Fall, 1991; Skinner 533 
& Reilly, 1989), and loss in image of the local community and the tourist area or the region (Barkham, 534 
2010; Nadeau, Kaplan, Sands, Moore, & Goodhue, 2014).   535 
4.2 Environmental impacts  536 
Oil spill disasters will often have vast negative environmental impacts. They may cause a loss of coastal 537 
areas and/or subsidence of land (Fall, 1991; Skinner & Reilly, 1989), contamination of beaches and 538 
rocks (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011; The Guardian, 2017b; Wells, 2016), negative impacts on 539 
wildlife, including the killing of mammals, fish stocks, seabirds and shorebirds and various marine 540 
resources (Adams, 2015; ITOPF, 2018; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 541 
Offshore Drilling, 2011). Loss of land may also be due to the handling of contaminated waste, or by 542 
setting up a quarry on land to store oil from beaches (The Guardian, 2017b). Such quarries may cause 543 
risks to wildlife, especially birds that may mistakenly identify it as a water source (Deutsche Welle, 544 
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2017). Shallow water sediments may become contaminated (Adams, 2015; Wells, 2016), as well as 545 
coastal vegetation, which may accelerate rates of erosion, wetlands may be lost (Lichtveld et al., 2016), 546 
in addition to damage to “deep-sea coral communities“ and “seaweed habitats harboring deep-sea 547 
shrimp, crab, and lobsters“ (Adams, 2015, p. 2). Unpleasant oil smells and/or smoke from a fire are 548 
also likely consequences of oil spills (CornwallLive, 2018; Jamieson, 2017).  549 
Environmental impacts of rigs or hulls may differ greatly depending on whether or not they can be 550 
towed ashore and dissembled in an environmentally sound manner. They may sink into the ocean, or 551 
wash-up onshore. To prevent the wreck of Torrey Canyon from washing up ashore, which would have 552 
caused considerable environmental harm, a decision was made to bomb and sink the tanker, even 553 
using napalm in the bombing (Wilson, 1973).  Chemical usage (dispersants) during the clean-up phase 554 
may cause negative environmental impacts (Wells, 2016), but there are also positive effects, such as 555 
decreased amounts of toxic gases inhaled by clean-up participants (Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative, 556 
2013). However, less is being said in the literature about the long-term effects of such chemical usage 557 
on organisms and the marine environment. Negative impacts on natives and subsistence ways of life 558 
may also occur (Fall, 1991) deriving from negative impacts on wildlife and marine resources. Food 559 
safety and security may therefore become an issue (Skinner & Reilly, 1989), due to resource 560 
contamination and reduced opportunities to source produce. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 561 
harvesting equipment was used in the clean-up, limiting time for fishing, hunting and gathering 562 
activities (Fall, 1991). Monitoring of late-emerging effects and long-term impacts on ecosystems needs 563 
to be carried out, although it was previously assumed “that impacts to populations derive almost 564 
exclusively from acute mortality”. However, in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the impacts on 565 
“the Alaskan coastal ecosystem, unexpected persistence of toxic subsurface oil and chronic exposures, 566 
even at sub-lethal levels, have continued to affect wildlife” (Peterson et al., 2003, p. 2082).  567 
4.3 Economic impacts  568 
While the impacts of oil spill disasters may be estimated shortly after the disaster “in terms of the costs 569 
associated with immediate and direct injuries to human lives, property, and productivity, the costs— 570 
short and long term—to the affected publics, their industries and commerce, and the environment 571 
cannot be accurately assessed” (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011, p. 8), it may take years or 572 
decades for the impacts to fully realize (Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, 2006; National 573 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). The Amoco Caldiz case 574 
revealed difficulties “in evaluating natural damages costs since these costs are highly dependent on 575 
the assumptions made in order to calculate them, the models used and the scarcity of data available” 576 
(Bonnieux & Rainelli, 1993, p. 169). Systemic costs of oil spills have been categorized as pollution direct 577 
costs, which include direct clean-up costs and the costs of restoration, and other physical effects being 578 
tourism trade, amenities, and marine resources (Bonnieux & Rainelli, 1993).   579 
The case of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates that individuals and 580 
businesses suffer economic losses, such as loss of jobs and earnings from recreation and tourism, 581 
commercial fisheries and marine-related resources (Adams, 2015), and the fish processing industry 582 
(Skinner & Reilly, 1989). One study on the BP Deepwater Horizon estimates the number of jobs lost 583 
during the period of 2010-2020 to be 22,000, corresponding to an $8.7 billion in economic loss (Sumaila 584 
et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the economic loss related to tourism was projected for the Gulf coastal area 585 
to amount to $22.7 billion for the period 2010-2013. These impacts last beyond the crisis resolution 586 
period, since there exist longer term impacts in terms of brand damage and tourist misperceptions 587 
(Oxford Economics, 2010). In the comparably sized case of Ixtoc Oil Spill (140 million gallons) it took 588 
three years for visitor spending to return to baseline pre-spill conditions, but in the case of the 589 
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comparatively minor Exxon Valdez spill (11 million gallons) it took about two years (Oxford Economics, 590 
2010).  591 
In addition to damage to individuals and peoples’ livelihoods (National Commission on the BP 592 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011) and businesses, there also exist negative 593 
economic damages to communities who need to be compensated for their loss (Adams, 2015). In 594 
addition, what may cause both short term and long term economic impacts is the perception of tourists 595 
about the safety of beaches, and consumers’ beliefs concerning whether or not the ocean, fish 596 
products and seafood are contaminated (Gill, Picou, & Ritchie, 2012). Oil spills may therefore result in 597 
a decrease in tax revenue for communities affected by the spill, as well as an increase in investments 598 
in cleanup (Picou & Martin, 2007). Local economic impacts may last for a long time. In case of the Exxon 599 
Valdez oil spill the herring fishery was closed, with few exceptions, to commercial fishing for 600 
approximately two decades (Struck, 2009). To mitigate short term unemployment, companies have 601 
gone so far, in the case of Deepwater Horizon, to keep employees on their payroll instead of laying 602 
them off. In most cases the companies did this at their own loss, covering their costs with a significant 603 
amount of their savings (Greater New Orleans Inc., 2011). When layoffs occur, these may lead to minor 604 
or major economic effects on locals in terms of their income, the extent depending greatly on how 605 
long people are unemployed.   606 
Although disaster waste may be collected and handled by contractors, such as was done in the case of 607 
Deepwater Horizon, where BP hired private contractors (Kubendran, 2011), it may be much more 608 
problematic to deal with in more remote areas, such as the Arctic. Paying for clean-up efforts is one 609 
aspect of oil spills, and the case of the Exxon Valdez involved an estimated clean-up cost of over $2 610 
billion. The oil spills, however, have another aspect which is relatively high paid clean-up jobs, where 611 
locals and commercial fishermen from affected communities are hired, thus creating a new source of 612 
income and cash infusion into local communities for a limited period of time (Russell, Downs, Strick, & 613 
Galginaitis, 2001). Oil spills may also create revenues for property owners, such as hotel owners, 614 
although the rate charged might be lower than for other hotel guests (Butler & Sayre, 2012). In the 615 
case of Deepwater Horizon, BP established the Vessels of Opportunity program, a way for local 616 
fishermen to earn some income outside the formal claims process. Boats owned by locals were used 617 
as a part of the response effort, such as to transport supplies, and for booming and skimming 618 
(Department of Ecology, 2014). For these reasons there might be an uneven recovery from economic 619 
recession as some may be able to earn a living, especially in the short-term, while others may not be 620 
in a position to do so at all. These efforts, however, do not mitigate the other social, psychological, and 621 
cultural consequences of oil spills and cleanup activities (Russell et al., 2001). Properties, public and 622 
private, may be contaminated, thus having negative impacts on property owners such as a loss in value 623 
and even property use (McCallion, 2011). Physical damages to properties may include personal 624 
properties, piers, boardwalks or seawalls, such as in the case of Amoco Cadiz, and these properties 625 
might be damaged either from the oil itself or during the clean-up process involving the use of high-626 
pressure hoses (National Ocean Service (NOAA), 1983).  627 
Cleaning up oil spills will be costly, not just for those responsible for the spill, but there will also be 628 
strain on local and/or national resources. Cost estimation is based on many factors, including oil spill 629 
persistence toxicity, spill amount, location, logistics, resources available, political and liability 630 
compensation regimes, response regulations and more. It also depends on shoreline impacts, ranging 631 
from non or minimal oiling to major oiling, oil type persistence ranging from no-persistence to heavy 632 
fuels, and cleanup strategies, where manual recovery is much costlier than only using dispersants 633 
(Etkin, 1999). Local cleanup cost may include increased costs of emergency, fire and police services, 634 
public health costs, costs related to waste collection, transportation and disposal generated by the 635 
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response and recovery efforts, communication costs and costs associated with managing volunteers 636 
(Stone, 2015).  637 
For listed companies oil spill disasters will most likely have stock price impacts, thus with financial 638 
consequences for stockholders. BP’s financial performance was significantly disrupted after the 639 
Deepwater Horizon spill, as well as the company’s stock price. In the first few months after the disaster 640 
the common stock of the company “lost more than half its value with the stock’s trading volume surge” 641 
(Chamberlin, 2014; Investopedia, 2018), meaning that stockholder wealth was being destroyed and 642 
they were trying to minimizing their loss by divesting from the company. Costly legal proceedings and 643 
court cases, already discussed in the paper, may also destroy financial values for stockholders. What 644 
may offset the costs the company/operator are faced with is a rise in oil prices after a disaster, such as 645 
was the case after the Deepwater Horizon spill (Vaughan, 2018).  646 
4.4 Security / policy implications 647 
Large oil spills may have both security and policy implications. These include actions that are 648 
immediate, as well as long-term and preventive actions. Immediate actions relate to emergency and 649 
security, in particular search and rescue operations for missing crew members of a tanker or an oil rig 650 
in order to saves lives (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, n.d.). They may also be 651 
carried out to protect the local environment and economic interests and industries, for instance when 652 
authorities will do the utmost to protect local, regional or national interests such as was the case with 653 
the Royal Navy actions and bombing of the Torrey Canyon wreck (The Guardian, 2017b; Wilson, 1973). 654 
Of immediate importance is also how to deal with the oil spill and oil contaminated waste and strain 655 
placed on health, sewer, and garbage agencies (Green et al., 2016). In the case of the Torrey Canyon 656 
the reported cost incurred by the British and French government was over $US 16 million, and efforts 657 
to clean up the spill took months (Federal Court of Australia, 2017). There are also occupational health 658 
and safety concerns such as inhalation exposure, exposure to chemicals, long working hours, potential 659 
physical injury or hypothermia (Skinner & Reilly, 1989), although it may take a long time for some of 660 
the health effects to materialize, along with their associated health costs. In this context it is of value 661 
to recognize that clean-up respondents often include volunteers who do not possess health coverage, 662 
and others dealing with the consequences may include local fishermen, firefighters, municipal workers 663 
and even military/navy personnel.  664 
Longer term actions include national/local governments investigations (Deepwater Horizon Study 665 
Group, 2011; Skinner & Reilly, 1989) and law suits against owner/operators of a tanker ("Oil pollution 666 
settlement," 1969) or a rig (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2017) to cover for 667 
economic and environmental losses. This may, however, be problematic, in particular when spills 668 
affect both coastal and international waters, meaning that solving legal issues becomes a matter of 669 
jurisdiction (Federal Court of Australia, 2017). Reforming of rules, regulations and/or international 670 
treaties is quite evident in the case of oil spills (Federal Court of Australia, 2017; Federal Register, 2018; 671 
U.S. Department of the Interior, 2010), as well as the establishment of new institutions or office(s) 672 
(Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, n.d.). Revision of preparedness, national response 673 
systems, and contingency plans covering coordination, responsibility, exercises, training, equipment, 674 
clean-up methods, communication efforts and so on, may also occur, since these are of great 675 
importance as “a first line of defense” (Skinner & Reilly, 1989, pp. ES-1). 676 
An issue of future security and potential societal costs is lobbyism by the oil industry. This was evident 677 
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill where the American Petroleum Institute increased its 678 
lobbying spending from $US 1.3 million to $US 2.3 million in the months before and after the crisis in 679 
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order to “influence Congress on a number of spill-related bills” related to liability and clean-up costs 680 
(Frates, 2010).   681 
Oil slicks from spills may also raise environmental awareness, an evident feature of the Torrey Canyon 682 
incident in 1967 (Barkham, 2010). What is also seen as worrisome in terms of the natural environment 683 
are impacts on generation of species (Chang, Stone, Demes, & Piscitelli, 2014), and also on generations 684 
of locals reliant on the natural environment for their livelihoods (Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 685 
Fisheries, 2011).   686 
4.5 Impact on businesses, business partners and contractors  687 
When systemic failures occur, the consequences may extend beyond the main operator to business 688 
partners and/or contractors who “share risks and rewards” of the development (National Commission 689 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 40). For the operators/owners of 690 
the ship or the rig there will be negative consequences. These could be loss of lives, property damage 691 
or loss (PwC, 2014), direct clean-up costs, national, local and/or civil settlements, criminal fines and 692 
penalties, costs of habitat restoration and the establishment of settlement funds (National 693 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011; National Oceanic and 694 
Atmospheric Administration, 2017). Property damage and/or loss may lead to loss in productivities 695 
and other consequences, not only for the property owner, but a network of business partners as well. 696 
In the Deepwater Horizon case BP was the project operator, Transocean was the offshore drilling 697 
operator and the owner and operator of the rig, Cameron provided blowout preventer equipment, 698 
and Halliburton was a service provider of cement used to stabilize the well’s walls (MIT Sloan, n.d.). 699 
Property damage or loss may then lead to financial losses for the companies involved in or impacted 700 
by the disaster, as BP’s partners and key contractors faced potential liability for damage to natural 701 
resources harmed by the oil spill in the wake of the disaster (National Commission on the BP 702 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Negative publicity, loss of reputation and trust 703 
is harder to quantify in terms of financial losses, but “an incident like the Exxon Valdez accident can 704 
crystalize public opinion against the petroleum industry almost instantaneously” (Skinner & Reilly, 705 
1989, p. 30). This can be seen in the reaction on social media in terms of possible boycotting activities 706 
of BP’s consumers, and a campaign against the company in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill 707 
(Rohrer, 2010).   708 
There are also consequences for the company responsible for the spill. In the case of BP Deepwater 709 
Horizon, the cumulative pre-tax cost of the incident amounted to $65.8 billion, with most of this cost 710 
relating to litigation and claims costs ($41.7 billion), followed by spill response cost ($14.3 billion) and 711 
environmental costs ($8.5 billion) (BP, 2018) (Investopedia, 2018). Negative impacts on public image 712 
and reputation (Kaye, 2015) are also likely impacts resulting in a drop in revenue and financial losses 713 
(World Finance, 2016). In addition, there may be consequences for the energy industry as a whole, 714 
with abrupt losses in earnings when government agencies halt deep-water drilling after an oil spill, and 715 
such decisions can extend to moratoriums on the issuing of shallow water oil drilling permits for a 716 
period of time (Greater New Orleans Inc., 2011).   717 
The outcome of court cases may depend on the specific regulatory framework in each country, but 718 
according to the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 there is a strict liability for “removal costs and certain 719 
damages resulting from the spill”, but a cap is imposed on liability damages, except in cases of “gross 720 
negligence, violation of applicable regulation, or act of war”. It should be noted that damages may 721 
exceed the existing caps, and those causing the damage may not have sufficient financial clout to fully 722 
cover the damage (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 723 
2011, p. 245), ensuring that the burden of negative externalities is ultimately suffered by oil spill 724 
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victims or taxpayers. For instance, in Australia, oil companies are able to claim tax reductions for 725 
cleanup costs, a form of indirect subsidy which transfers cleanup costs to taxpayers (The Guardian, 726 
2017a). This suggests that the settling of litigation cases will not compensate fairly all those affected 727 
by oil spills (Russell et al., 2001). Litigation cases may be of a civil and criminal nature, and when the 728 
Federal district judge approved settlements of $US 20.8 billion, in the case of Deepwater Horizon, it 729 
was the largest environmental damage settlement in US history. The settlement was allocated to 730 
ecological, economic and coordination of restoration efforts, criminal penalties and research efforts. 731 
In addition, private claims were estimated in October 2016 to amount to $US 14.8 billion (National 732 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2017). 733 
There may also be personal consequences for the captain of the ship, the CEO of the company, 734 
management, supervisors or others. In the case of Deepwater Horizon the CEO of BP, Tony Hayward, 735 
had to leave the company due to pressure over how he handled the disaster (The Guardian, 2010). The 736 
same case lead to the filing of manslaughter charges against the supervisor responsible for safety on 737 
board the rig, albeit these charges were later dropped (NBC News, 2015). In the case of the Exxon 738 
Valdez criminal charges were filed against the captain of the ship, based on his intoxication, negligent 739 
discharge of oil and reckless endangerment (Berliner, 1989).  740 
As a consequence of an oil spill the company may also face operational obstructions, such as temporary 741 
bans on supplying fuels to governmental clients, bans on bidding for new drilling projects (Chamberlin, 742 
2014) or tighter environmental regulations in the wake of a disaster (PwC, 2014). As explained before, 743 
companies may therefore increase spending on lobbyism in order to minimize the negative impacts of 744 
possible policy reform, such as cases of liability or cleanup costs (Frates, 2010).   745 
4.6 The Arctic Context of oil spills 746 
Irrespective of the small population in the Arctic, the region is becoming increasingly important in an 747 
economic and geopolitical sense, given the potential of developing significant amounts of oil, gas, and 748 
mineral resources (Anisimov et al., 2007; Malinauskaite et al., 2019). In the Arctic an increase in 749 
economic activities, such as offshore energy production, will increase the risk of major pollution 750 
incidents such as oil spills, with potentially negative impacts on local food sources because of 751 
contaminants and toxic substances that accumulate in the food chain of animals consumed as 752 
traditional foods (AMAP, 2015). Significant spills may occur as a result of trans-Atlantic or destination 753 
shipping, or offshore energy developments (SINTEF, 2011). As a consequence of oil spill risks, the Arctic 754 
Council initiated a project, ‘Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response’ (EPPR), and published 755 
a subsequent technical report on circumpolar oil spill response (EPPR, 2017). The report discusses 756 
weather conditions in the Arctic, i.e. “effects of wind, waves effects of wind, waves, air temperature, 757 
wind chill, sea ice, superstructure icing, horizontal visibility, and daylight/darkness” on particular oil 758 
spill response systems (EPPR, 2017, p. iii)”. These systems are 1) mechanical of vessels, ranging from 759 
1-3 ships taking part in the recovery, 2) dispersants from the vessel, aircraft or a helicopter, or 3) in-760 
situ burning techniques of vessels or helicopters. The Arctic Council’s working groups and task forces, 761 
current and previous, are instrumental in initiating work that may reduce oil related risks in the region, 762 
as they are or have been focusing on issues such as telecommunication and connectivity, marine oil 763 
pollution prevention, preparedness and response, and search and rescue (Arctic Council, 2018c).   764 
The scope of the prevention, preparedness and response study neither included systemic risks and 765 
impacts of oil spills, such as long-term environmental, human or social impacts nor a “comprehensive 766 
overview of Arctic oil spill response options or implementation (EPPR, 2017, p. 2)”. Instead, another 767 
Arctic Council Working Group specifically focused on surveying community leaders and local 768 
emergency response officials on oil spill preparedness in small communities. The main outcome of the 769 
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survey was a need for greater risk awareness and local level preparedness, as well as access to 770 
information about best practices, the role of national governments in addressing lack of awareness 771 
and misperception, and a gap in terms of preparedness corresponding to risks (Arctic Council, 2018b). 772 
Furthermore, a database including a response to self-assessment was created, as well as a spill 773 
response and recovery library. The findings, furthermore, suggested that “roughly 25% of small 774 
communities are prepared relative to risk; 50% of small communities are moderately prepared relative 775 
to risk; and 25% are less than adequately prepared relative to risk“ (Arctic Council, 2018b, p. 6). It is 776 
highlighted that in order to address the economic development in the Arctic and the environmental 777 
change taking place, impacts will occur to indigenous ways of life and their traditional activities, but at 778 
the same time indigenous knowledge on the conservation and sustainable use of resources should be 779 
recognized and embedded in policy making (Arctic Council, 2016b). It is the “Arctic peoples [that] have 780 
the most to offer, and the most to lose, from any future scenario in the Arctic“ (Stotts, 2010). Locals 781 
have criticized the capacity of the oil industry and the government to handle the oil spill in the Gulf of 782 
Mexico in 2010, however, oil spills in ice infested waters are even harder to deal with than events in 783 
open water, and Arctic waters “might never recover from an environmental catastrophe like the one 784 
in the Gulf of Mexico” (Stotts, 2010).  785 
Liability in itself involves implications for oil and gas developments in the Arctic since international 786 
conventions or international agreements do not exist that “establishes a liability system for claims for 787 
compensation or the cost of cleaning up pollution for an offshore oil and gas incident either in the 788 
Arctic or anywhere else in the world” (WWF, 2015, p. 7). For this reason, liability legislation in each 789 
country would apply in the event of an oil spill, but the liability systems of the respective Arctic nations 790 
differ considerably. In four cases that have been studied (Canada, Demark/Greenland, Norway, United 791 
States), operators/licensees need to “provide evidence of financial security to carry out offshore oil 792 
and gas activities” and measures are defined in their licenses, but these could be bonds, insurance, 793 
self-insurance, guarantees from third parties such as a mother company or letters of credits, or 794 
membership in a pooled fund (WWF, 2015, p. 7),. Combinations of financial security instruments are 795 
also allowed. However, gaps in the liability systems of Arctic states have been identified, and it has 796 
been proposed that the Arctic Council should consider establishment of an Arctic offshore oil spill 797 
compensation fund which would align with the polluter pays principle (WWF, 2015). It should be noted 798 
that in some cases there is a strict liability, but in other cases there is an overall cap on claims payments 799 
and the scope of claims may either be limited or the scope of the coverage is unclear (Emmerson & 800 
Lahn, 2012; WWF, 2015). What complicates things further is the potential trans-national impact of oil 801 
spills, meaning it has to be established who is/are liable and under what liability regime. This is costly 802 
and it can take a long time to settle such disputes (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). The agreement on 803 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic does not solve these 804 
issues, and the only cost that is addressed in this agreement is the cost of assistance, i.e. from another 805 
vessel (Arctic Council, 2013).  806 
Due to the following factors (I) geographical and biological characteristics of the region and Arctic 807 
weather and sea conditions (EPPR, 2017), (II) infrastructure limitations in the Arctic (Emmerson & Lahn, 808 
2012; Skinner & Reilly, 1989), (III) mainly moderate (50%) or limited capability (25%), relative to risk, 809 
of small communities to deal with oil spill risks and consequences (Arctic Council, 2018b), the 810 
systematic consequences of oil spills might be worse in the Arctic that in many other places around 811 
the globe. The risk for Arctic ecosystems might be disproportionally high due to local conditions, and 812 
oil spills may be caused by factors such as “mechanical or structural failure, human error, acts of God, 813 
inadequate or inappropriate design [for Arctic conditions], and sabotage” (Skinner & Reilly, 1989, p. 814 
1). Ecosystems, various species, and local communities may be especially vulnerable to the 815 
consequences and adversely affected (Anisimov et al., 2007). Indigenous peoples, and their traditional 816 
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way of living, are at risk since Arctic sensitive ecosystems on sea and land are source of their nutrition, 817 
in addition to having economic, cultural and social values (AMAP, 2015; IPCC, 2018). For Arctic peoples, 818 
economic development should not jeopardize the natural environment, and in order to reach this goal 819 
three principles are emphasized; sound science, prudent management based on conservation, and a 820 
responsive public process (Arctic Council, 1999).  821 
One issue worth mentioning in the Arctic context is that it may take time for oil spill control equipment 822 
to arrive at the scene (Skinner & Reilly, 1989), as well as for clean-up experts to arrive to deal with the 823 
disaster. The clean-up cost many therefore be significantly costlier in the Arctic than in less remote 824 
areas with more developed infrastructure. In addition, that managing of the cleanup may depend on 825 
geomorphology, weather conditions, actions of waves, tides, and various dispersants (Bonnieux & 826 
Rainelli, 1993).   827 
4.7 Insurance in the context of oil spills in the Arctic  828 
In a seminal report (2012), initiated by Lloyd’s of London, on opportunities and risk in the Arctic, key 829 
industry sectors are discussed, including mining, oil and gas, fisheries, shipping and logistics, and 830 
tourism. Risk categories are identified as operational, regulatory, environmental and liability 831 
(Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). The study acknowledges that there may be opposing interests in economic 832 
development, and that several companies may be involved in cases of pollution, making it hard to 833 
allocate liability, but the discussion about the social and cultural aspects of the development are more 834 
or less missing. The same gap applies to a Lloyd’s report on the challenges and implications of drilling 835 
in extreme environments (Rees & Sharp, 2011), and a report recognizing that environmental systemic 836 
risk is of an increasing importance, with possible impacts for insurers who endeavor to deal with the 837 
risks of such an eventuality (PwC, 2014). Barriers to the embedding of environmental systemic risk in 838 
insurance mechanisms are lack of understanding, the limits of insurability, reactive pricing, uncertainty 839 
and lack of data, regulatory issues, and competitive pressure (PwC, 2014).   840 
Limited discussion has occurred on the role of insurance in cases of oil spills, such as their role in loss 841 
prevention and claims settlement, although it has been brought up by the Lloyd‘s of London that the 842 
energy industry needs to “adopt standards that ensure safety and reliability in the design and 843 
execution of drilling in extreme environments”, and insurers also need to “identify and monitor their 844 
accumulative exposure” to such risk (Rees & Sharp, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, in cases of oil rig loss, 845 
such as the BP Deepwater Horizon, types of relevant insurance coverage include insurance against 846 
physical damage or loss of equipment and property owned by the company and/or operator, coverage 847 
during and after the construction of a project, business interruption/loss of production income, 848 
operator’s extra expenses when they need to regain control over the well, liability, including 849 
comprehensive general liability, workers compensation/employer’s liability in case of injuries or death, 850 
and environmental/pollution liability (Hartwig, 2010).  851 
Insurers have multiple roles, including product and service offering, underwriting and risk 852 
management, loss prevention and claims settlement, and investments (Johannsdottir & McInerney, 853 
2018; Johannsdottir & Wallace, 2019a). They can bridge the gap between heterogeneous stakeholders 854 
(Johannsdottir & Wallace, 2019a), and can also, as institutional investors, influence companies 855 
behavior and market trends, such as “to insist that environmental considerations are incorporated into 856 
overall strategic and resilience planning“. Insurers can talk to governments and regulators, collaborate 857 
with other insurers and reinsurers, build close relations with providers of information, engaging more 858 
with customers, and participate in industry initiatives (PwC, 2014). On an individual company level, 859 
insurers can develop mandates from their boards for identifying environmental systemic risk (both 860 
financial and non-financial), review their investment portfolios, identify competitive advantage 861 
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opportunities, review their underwriting guidelines so that they take into account environmental 862 
systemic risks, identify data and carry out research, and strengthen the skills of their employees, and 863 
provide information, tools and training, so that employees are in position to deal with such types of 864 
risk (PwC, 2014). Moreover, general principles of risk assessment may be employed, which are to 1) 865 
assess risks relative to objectives, or interests (what should be avoided and what is the likelihood), 2) 866 
assess what are the biggest risks (worst-case scenarios), 3) consider the full range of probabilities (low 867 
probability might result in high risk), 4) use the best available information (could be science, expert 868 
judgement – or in the case of the Arctic, include indigenous knowledge), 5) take a holistic view, 869 
including systemic risk and direct risk, and 5) be explicit about value judgements (King et al., 2015).  870 
The insurance sector has highlighted the importance of public understanding of risk since there is an 871 
inconsistency between perceived and actual risk, and that increased understanding will improve the 872 
quality of decisions made by individuals, businesses and policymakers (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 873 
2017). A part of this understanding would be to bring forth information about the extent of financial 874 
losses, in case of oil spills, that were absorbed by insurance companies but this type of information is 875 
very challenging to find. Nevertheless, it is important to bring forth information regarding terms and 876 
conditions under which Arctic shipping and energy projects are covered, so that possible gaps in 877 
coverage in cases of worst-case scenarios may be identified. In scenarios of maritime casualties, costs 878 
are generally absorbed by a complicated system of insurance underwriting and protection and 879 
indemnity clubs (Harrald, Marcus, & Wallace, 1990). Less is known about other types of consequences, 880 
or insurance terms and conditions such as for Arctic shipping (Sarrabezoles, Lasserre, & Hagouagn’rin, 881 
2016) or energy development/operation projects, as this information is seldom disclosed by insurance 882 
companies, although it is known that insurance companies impose stricter requirements and higher 883 
premiums on Arctic shipping contracts than for other shipping contracts (Sarrabezoles et al., 2016).  884 
The insurance sector plays an instrumental role in enhancing best practice, relating to energy 885 
developments in the Arctic and Arctic shipping practice, and the sector made a contribution to the 886 
development of the Polar Code, since there is a “risk-based approach in determining scope and to 887 
adopt a holistic approach in mitigating all risks to acceptable levels” (Arctic Portal, 2016). The 888 
International Union of Marine Insurance supported the development of the Arctic Marine Best Practice 889 
Declaration (Backman, Rohlén, & Kingston, 2013), an initiative that fosters “common ice regime 890 
guidelines in the Arctic that would support the Polar Code and improve safety standards”, and POLARIS 891 
(Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System), a regime system (Arctic Portal, 2016). The 892 
Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor) has developed a checklist for underwriters and 893 
owners/managers for assessing risks associated with voyages in Arctic waters with the purpose of 894 
heightening their awareness of risks associated with such journeys. The list covers accident scenarios 895 
of different nature, but it highlights infrastructure limitations in the region and limited search and 896 
rescue resources, stating that “minor casualty can become extremely costly“ due to the remoteness 897 
of the Arctic location (The Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor), 2012). To minimize risk, the 898 
checklist advocates addressing the necessary documentation to comply with national regulations, 899 
focus on the suitability of the vessel, logistical and meteorological preparedness, and ensure crew 900 
competence in order to fulfil contractual duties and the respective responsibilities of all parties 901 
involved in the voyage (The Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor), 2012).  902 
5. Discussion  903 
5.1 Arctic and insurance implications 904 
Politically influential strategy documents (Wilson Center 2014; Emmerson and Lahn 2012a; Foreign 905 
and Commonwealth Office 2013) tend to keep social/cultural and ecological dimensions comparatively 906 
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separate, although some call for much more engaged and integrated approaches to Arctic 907 
management (Clement et al. 2013). Indeed, in recent times, the Arctic Council have called for 908 
ecosystem-based approaches to the management of environmental resources, a holistic approach 909 
integrative of economic, environmental and socio-cultural objectives, with the pursuit of human 910 
wellbeing and minimization of harms to it at its core (Arctic Council, 2013b; Malinauskaite et al., 2019). 911 
As far as the authors are aware, no studies have yet been carried out on the extent to which the 912 
management of Arctic resources accords with visions of ecosystem-based management, although the 913 
Arctic Council has deemed the approach of sufficient importance to establish an Expert Group on the 914 
topic, which is focused on developing the topic so that it becomes the overarching goal of the 915 
institution (Malinauskaite et al., 2019).  916 
The insurance sector seems to have a role to play in terms of raising awareness about Arctic related 917 
business risks, among business leaders, policymakers, and individuals (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 918 
2017), and an instrumental role in enhancing best practice, both in cases of energy developments and 919 
shipping practice (Arctic Portal, 2016; The Nordic Association of Marine Insurers (Cefor), 2012). This 920 
may be recognized as a loss prevention initiative of insurers. Risks may also be minimized if systemic 921 
risks are identified and relevant systemic crisis management strategies emphasized and implemented, 922 
taking into account exercise, training, equipment, financial aspect, prevention, logistics, infrastructure, 923 
clean-up methods, communication, and contingency plans and response system(s). Moreover, there 924 
is increasing evidence that the insurance industry is concerned, with a “series of major financial 925 
institutions to raise a red flag about investment in Arctic oil operations over concerns about climate 926 
change and environmental risks” (Arctic Today, 2019). Equally, observant of such worries, it is expected 927 
that stakeholders will gradually expect insurers to consider environmental systemic risks given the 928 
wide impacts these losses can have (PwC, 2014). Despite the importance of systemic risk, HROs, and 929 
megaprojects for Arctic economic development, limited information about this subject is available on 930 
the Arctic Council’s website. However, much greater information exists on oil spills, and it is evident 931 
that increased oil and gas exploration, as well as shipping, are growing concerns, and that there is an 932 
emerging need for knowledge on these topics (Arctic Council, n.d.). Additionally, more can be done to 933 
prevent oil spills in Arctic waters and to enhance adequate response capacity to spills across the Arctic 934 
(PAME, 2011). Increased traffic in the Arctic is expected to increase the likelihood of incidents, in turn 935 
increasing risk. In relation to oil and gas activities, collaboration is needed, including the engagement 936 
of indigenous peoples, risk assessment/analysis, and emergency preparedness and response (Arctic 937 
Council, 2016c), as this approach may minimize risks and help resolve potential conflicts between the 938 
often competing interests of fisheries, local community subsistence livelihoods, and the oil and gas 939 
industry (ARAF Chair, 2016; Arctic Council, 2016b).  940 
Insurance has been identified in licenses as a suite of financial security approaches used to cover risky 941 
offshore oil and gas activities, the others being bonds, self-insurance, guarantees from third parties, 942 
or membership of a pooled fund (WWF, 2015). Self-insurance is, however, unfeasible in most cases, 943 
with only the largest companies in position to deal financially with major accidents (National 944 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).  Limited information 945 
is available regarding insurance coverage in licenses, terms and conditions, or, in cases of oil spill 946 
disasters, the proportion of financial losses absorbed by insurance companies. This is nevertheless of 947 
importance, since encouraging responsible risk-management can be highlighted through the insurance 948 
premium (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011) and 949 
conditions. Knowledge gaps related to coverage in worst-case scenarios is evident, except that 950 
insurance premiums increased by up to 50 percent for deep-water operations in the wake of the 951 
Deepwater Horizon spill, and there was a potential risk of elimination or raising of the liability cap 952 
through legislative efforts so that social costs may be covered (National Commission on the BP 953 
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Such reform of legislation may cause 954 
insurance companies to shy away from offering oil pollution coverage, since social costs may be 955 
unpredictable or too costly. If liability limits are raised, it is expected that new safety methods and 956 
techniques will be promoted/insisted by insurers and risks monitored (National Commission on the BP 957 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Barriers within the insurance sector are also 958 
recognized, including limits of insurability, reactive pricing, uncertainty and lack of data, regulatory 959 
barriers, and competitive pressures (PwC, 2014).  960 
5.2 General reflections on systemic risk and marine-related oil spills 961 
The first part of the paper defined systemic risk – although there is no universal definition existing, a 962 
trigger event or tipping point is emphasized. An institutional failure or economic shock could cause “a 963 
chain of bad economic consequences - sometimes referred to as a domino effect (Schwarcz, 2008, p. 964 
198)”. This depiction, however, highlighted that systemic risk is quite often discussed or defined in the 965 
context of financial systems of market price volatility (Schwarcz, 2008), or structural flaws. Viewing 966 
systemic risk solely as a risk to a financial system may be considered too limited, and instead systems 967 
to be considered should include environmental, social, financial, and technological dimensions (Baue, 968 
2017; Burckart et al., 2016; King et al., 2015; Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2017), all of which are highly 969 
interconnected (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2017). This is already recognized by the insurance sector, 970 
which has identified the characteristics of systemic risks (PwC, 2014). In order to protect a whole 971 
system from a systemic risk, regulation is needed to internalize or prevent the risk from materializing, 972 
otherwise the cost will be externalized (Goldin & Vogel, 2010; Humphreys & Thompson, 2014). 973 
Regulatory cost should, however, not exceed its benefits (Schwarcz, 2008). The analysis in this paper 974 
also shows that the risk focus is usually on enterprise level risks or risks in investment portfolios, 975 
although investors are starting to recognize systemic risks, and to a lesser extent existential risk (Thurm 976 
et al., 2018). The Polar Code has the potential to mitigate some of the risks of sailing in polar waters, 977 
but it has its limitations (Fedi et al., 2018), one being a decided focus on enterprise level risks.  978 
High reliable organizations (HROs) need to be recognized as well (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 979 
2011; Roberts & Bea, 2001), since these organizations will run complicated systems (Roberts & Bea, 980 
2001) that may fail. Megaprojects, such as infrastructure projects, offshore oil and gas extraction or 981 
large container or cruise ships, are highly relevant to considerations of systemic risk and its likelihood.  982 
The second aspect of the paper used a broad case study approach, not limited to the Arctic, to highlight 983 
the potential systematic consequences of oil spills in marine environments. Five impact categories 984 
were identified and their consequences discussed in turn. The categories were 1) social/cultural, 2) 985 
environmental, 3) economic, 4) security/policy, and 5) businesses and their partners. Through this 986 
analysis, it is evident that the most detailed information exists on the most recent cases of oil spills or 987 
cases with comparatively vast impacts, including the Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon Study 988 
Group, 2011; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011), 989 
and the Exxon Valdez cases (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012; Rees & Sharp, 2011).   990 
Even in the most recent case analyzed, Deepwater Horizon, “energy exploration and production, 991 
particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has 992 
been adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the future (National 993 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. vii)”. The Deepwater 994 
Horizon case, in the third part of the paper, highlighted how regulatory oversight is not sufficient in 995 
itself, so the hydrocarbon industry needs to increase safety throughout the sector, such as by 996 
implementing self-guiding mechanisms. Furthermore, it is also claimed that limited scientific 997 
understanding of environmental circumstances, and the natural and human impacts of oil spills in 998 
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sensitive environments, including the Arctic, is insufficient (National Commission on the BP Deepwater 999 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).    1000 
The fourth, and the last, aspect of the paper considered the role of insurance in eventualities of major 1001 
marine-related oil spills. From the analysis, it is evident that the insurance sector is already recognizing 1002 
the characteristics of systemic risks (PwC, 2014) and that environmental systemic risk is of an 1003 
increasing importance (PwC, 2014), as well as the various opportunities and risks of economic 1004 
development in the Arctic (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012), and the challenges and implications of drilling in 1005 
extreme environments (Rees & Sharp, 2011). Four risk categories or Arctic-related risks are recognized: 1006 
environmental, operational, regulatory, and liability (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). Comparing these 1007 
categories with the systemic risks identified in Figure 6, it is clear that social/cultural impacts are not 1008 
addressed and perhaps security implications. To a limited extent, environmental and economic 1009 
impacts are discussed, as well as impacts on business and policy (regulatory) standards. Additionally, 1010 
a new issue in terms of oil spill impacts is the impact of social media discussion (Starbird et al., 2015) 1011 
which companies need to plan for in case such events unfold. Negative social media debate may 1012 
constitute an intangible risk related to a company’s brand image and a financial risk if it leads to the 1013 
boycotting of their products and services. 1014 
6. Conclusion 1015 
Developments in the Arctic are inherently risky. In recent times, considerable emphasis has been 1016 
placed on opportunities to develop the Arctic’s untapped hydrocarbon resources and expand trans-1017 
national shipping activities, in part due to the global scarcity of fossil fuels but also because of the 1018 
emerging accessibility of resources and routes, events driven by climate change. This paper has 1019 
highlighted how risks in relation to marine oil spills tend to be thought of in isolation, with an emphasis 1020 
on managing, through the instrument of insurance, their enterprise aspects, as opposed to the 1021 
systemic consequences. Using a case study approach, both in general and specific to the Arctic, this 1022 
paper outlined the core implications of major marine-related oil spills, which have a multitude of 1023 
impacts across several dimensions, including social and cultural, environmental, economic, security 1024 
and policy, and business and partners. These, combined, can lead to systemic risk consequences, 1025 
whereby a marine-related oil spill could precipitate, or act as a tipping point for, the severe instability 1026 
or collapse of an industry. This risk is all the more acute in the Arctic, as the cited Exxon Valdez case 1027 
study illustrated, and is reinforced by the challenges faced by shipping companies and hydrocarbon 1028 
explorers in securing insurance to operate in Arctic waters.  1029 
Recent legal agreements, such as the Polar Code, have made a contribution to ensuring the safety of 1030 
shipping in the Arctic, however, considerable risks remain relating to the remoteness of the region, 1031 
extreme weather events, and limited availability of search and rescue services. Given these factors and 1032 
the potential impacts to the 4 million inhabitants of the Arctic, many of whom are indigenous and rely 1033 
on subsistence lifestyles, it is apparent that the potential for systemic risk events has been largely 1034 
overlooked in the debate about how Arctic resources are managed and the deployment of appropriate 1035 
insurance tools to manage risk. In recent times, the Arctic Council has begun to emphasize the 1036 
importance of managing the region’s pristine ecosystems in a more holistic manner, especially through 1037 
the approach of ecosystem-based management. This approach places the importance of 1038 
environmental sustainability as a primary objective alongside the maintenance of human wellbeing 1039 
across the Arctic. Although yet to be assessed or implemented in a practical context, the approach has 1040 
considerable potential for ensuring the sustainability of marine environments in the Arctic, and 1041 
thereby minimizing risk. It was in the spirit of ecosystem-based management that this paper proposed 1042 
two new frameworks, where subsistence and market economy activities were placed in an institutional 1043 
and environmental context. This has relevance with regards to the management of systemic risks, but 1044 
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also shows the interplay between the subsistence and market economy activities, where conflicting 1045 
interests may arise related to the utilization of hydrocarbon resources in the region. Given this, 1046 
meaningful engagement of indigenous peoples and other inhabitants in the management of Arctic 1047 
resources is of critical importance, since systemic risk may ultimately result in existential risk (in case 1048 
of oil related disasters) for those on the subsistence level of the pyramid. Equally, the insurance 1049 
industry has an important role when rules and regulations in the Arctic are formulated and further 1050 
refined, including the raising of awareness and endeavoring to embed insurance terms and conditions 1051 
in decision-making protocols.  1052 
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